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Executive Registry

63-3169

9 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Assistant Secretary of Defense
 John H. Rubel (Present: Mr. McCone, [redacted]
 Dr. Scoville, Mr. Sheldon, Dr. Wheelon, [redacted])

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1. The luncheon opened with a discussion of Mr. Rubel's recent visit to a Minute Man missile site in Montana, and his comments on how difficult it was to locate the site from a helicopter--even by experts in charge of the program. There was discussion as to whether attempts had ever been made to photograph Minute Man sites from a U-2, and comment on the aerial photography of Titan and Atlas sites which had been used to test U.S. PI efforts.

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2. The above led into a general discussion of the Soviet versus U. S. missile efforts and Mr. Rubel commented on how many similarities there were in the programs and how many of the Soviet failures were similar to some of our failures. [redacted]

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25X1 There was comment to the effect that the Soviets had had a greater rate of failures than the U.S. and that their proportion of failures seemed to be increasing while our proportion of failures was decreasing. [redacted]

compared to our more frequent tests of actual warheads. [redacted]

3. Mr. Rubel then turned to the question of the CCP and produced Volume IV, Part I, of the study of intelligence targets analyzing the allocation of effort, and mentioned the group which had participated in the formulation of the procedural and substantive aspects of the CCP. (He showed the DCI the general manner in which this report was arranged.)

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At this particular juncture the meeting adjourned from the dining room to the conference room. Mr. Rubel went on to say that he felt this effort, which had dropped about six weeks behind schedule--something that did not greatly concern him--would provide everybody with the managerial tool in which to analyze the over-all SIGINT effort. There followed a general discussion as to whether this covered ELINT and as to how the ELINT program, including the more than [redacted] was

25X1 controlled. [redacted] pointed out that ELINT was one of the targets in the study, but it was generally agreed that this still would not affect the maximum information to establish the proper managerial control of the target.

Mr. Rubel said that in May or June this study would be in a position to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, and he thought the DCI should provide the Secretary of Defense with comments on the program from the intelligence point of view. He pointed out that in the meantime the DCI's staff would have the study as it was being produced and would have adequate opportunity to prepare the necessary comments.

4. There then followed discussion on the general relations between NSA and CIA, and both Mr. Rubel and Mr. McCone commented favorably on the work done by General Blake. Mr. Rubel pointed out that relations between NSA and NRO had been very poor until General Blake took office, and that NSA now had a man assigned to NRO and relations were excellent.

Mr. Sheldon described a recent meeting between NSA and CIA on the over-all problem of interagency relations, but with specific reference to close support, and reaffirmed that relations were excellent. There was discussion of the problem of getting good people for NSA, both civilian and military, which was reported to be the biggest problem of that Agency. This led to a discussion of the use of the polygraph in security practices, and the DCI indicated that he planned to discuss this matter with General Blake, and because of his responsibility for the protection of sources and methods, he felt that NSA should not have security standards any less high than those of CIA or other agencies in the sensitive role of the Government.

5. Mr. McCone then referred to his plan for an organization to pull together the intelligence on Soviet missile efforts, and pointed out that Dr. Wheelon had discussed this with Mr. Rubel. Mr. Rubel indicated that he fully concurred in this effort, and suggested that when CIA was ready, initial discussion should be with the office of Solis Horwitz, to whom the Secretary of Defense looks for all organization and management problems.

25X1 ACTION: When DD/I has the [redacted] ready and cleared with DCI, the undersigned will take the responsibility for opening negotiations with Horwitz.

[redacted]

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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